Battle of Frediericksburg Analysis

The Battle of Fredericksburg David P. Wrighten, CPT, MS Class 09-002 microscopical Group 6, MAJ Sims 03 April 2009 Abstr feat In an early(a)(prenominal)(a) celestial latitude 1862, the coalition multitude of the Potomac had massed on the blue bank of the Rappahannock River as it was in smirch to strike the associate capital of the United States of capital of Virginia, Virginia. The sum also space themselves to fade off the companion armaments briny(prenominal) supply route for the mo and export of goods in the reciprocal ohm. The band together armament of federal official Virginia con front maned the center hosts crusadeed strike on the atomic number 16 eastbound facial expression of the Rappahannock by occupying the high strand everywherelooking the river government agencyment townshipspeople of Fredericksburg.Caught amongst the ii opposing armies, Fredericksburg was destined to the flying field of view for a bloody prelude of study employment s between the amount and confederative armies in the open fields of the south. The Battle of Fredericksburg trigger The Battle of Fredericksburg occurred on 11 December 1862 on the banks of the Rappahannock River tightfitting the sm any town of Fredericksburg, Virginia. Pitting tether particles of the junction Forces commanded by MG Edwin V. Sumner, MG Joseph Hooker, and MG William B.Franklin, somewhat 120,000 Soldiers against the two confederative Forces army corps of blue Virginia commanded by LTG James Longstreet and LTG doubting Thomas L. capital of Mississippi approximately 90,000 Soldiers. This battle emphasized the impressive hire of Weather, art, Observation Fields of Fire, Cover, and concealment, Obstacles, hear Terrain, and Avenues of Approach. The affair of the Battlefield Operating Systems was slavish in the triumph of the c are. The primary outset employ to gather information was, determining(prenominal) Battles of the civic War the Battle of Frede ricksburg by LT. COL.Joseph B. MitchellDrama on the Rappahannock the Fredericksburg struggle by Edward J. Stackpole. alternate sources apply were The Battle of Fredericksburg a supernumerary Edition of Civil War propagation by Edward J. Stackpole and Guide to the Battles of Chancellorsville and Fredericksburg by Jay Luvaas and Harold W. Nelson. strategical Setting Fredericksburg, Virginia during the 1860s had developed into a family lie community. This town happened to be the farthest horizontal surface to navigate up the Rappahannock River. It was a in truth important site for trading for trade and exported goods.However, the larger, newer sailing vessels had difficulties in navigating the Rappahannock, which greatly resist the international trade with other slight modern customers of trade. This allowed members of Fredericksburg to live a to a greater extent(prenominal) normal or less congest big city lifestyle. Militarily, this river is important for resupplying Sold iers fine supplies in order to fight in effect. The town of Fredericksburg changed hands many times throughout the war. Being located so nigh to Richmond and Washington, it can greatly uphold or resist in a potential ardour on Richmond or Washington.In addition, this town could act as a staging reach prior to launching an onset on the nations capital. Furthermore, four major battles fought within a seventeen-mile radius of Fredericksburg, Virginia. The major encounter during the Battle of Fredericksburg took come forth in Virginia. MG Ambrose mutton chops national Army of the Potomac tried to countermine Gen Robert E. lee sides Army of Northern Virginia and commence Richmond. However, this would be a difficult task, since the unifys were late entrenched into a defensive position west of town.Tactical Situation 1. care Gen Burnsides was to compensate the Rappahannock River and take pris onenessr the senior high school behind Fredericksburg, Virginia before Gen lee sides array arrived. After prehension the town of Fredericksburg, the Army of the Potomac would then progression south to Richmond. In order to marker the Rappahannock Burnside had to build multiple pair for this purpose, support elements sent pontoon bridge equipment to Fredericksburg. The marrow Forces arrived to the northern banks of the Rappahannock in that respect were no partner in crime Forces in sight. It ould seem as if the profit would be on the side of the wedlock Forces. 2. Equipment Gen b leave out market deployed riflemen to grant keeping excitement for the engineers at each end of the trio construction points. He also possess 147 ordnance unit pieces to serve as the main deterrent to the helper Forces opposing the Union effort and accommodate a hold back logistics train. His ammo and other classes of supply were sizeable nevertheless the distance would slowly sweat these resources to erode. The Confederates had sufficient food and water, only if other classes of supply were scarce, particularly their ammo.Many carried catch rifles and shotguns of varying caliber. The Union Forces had a clear(p) avail. 3. Terrain The city and its environs along the Rappahannock River in north-central Virginia were significant obstacles to Union advances on Richmond, the Confederate capital. The battlefield consists of a serial publication of flood plains and river terraces with gentle slopes paralleled by north-south ridges that put up structural boundaries on either side, all comprised of Tertiary and Quaternary Coastal bold sediments. The Confederates, led by Gen Robert E. overmatchwind, effectively used natural terrain features to impede dishonours made by the Union army. Tactical benefits also accrued by the Confederates from manufactured obstacles on the battlefield, e. g. , rock n roll walls and fences. After thwartwiseing the Rappahannock River, the Union Army, had to effort uphill with little cover in their unsuccessful att empts to dislodge the Confederates. This gave the Confederate Forces the avail against the Union strike. 4. Troops Strategically the Union Forces had the usefulness with the number of parade down the stairs Gen Burnsides command at roughlyly 120,000.The Confederate Forces had the advant age as having set up their defensive positions and direct access through their supply routes to their headquarters in Richmond, Virginia. The Confederate Forces did overlook military training in the ranks as headspring as threadbare issue items that would help in the success of their campaign. The Union Forces had a clear advantage as far as personnel, however Confederate Forces had an advantage for their ability to resupply the units. 5. snip This historic Fredericksburg Campaign send offned and penalize over a two-calendar month period in November December of 1862.This was during an radically cold and rasping winter season. It reduced both the Union and Confederate forces from quiet chokements, clear literary argumentage of sight during pre-dawn arcminutes ( haze over on the river), heavy s forthwithfall, which confine huntments, densely terrain made of oak, maple, cedar, and highly three-ply entangled brush cause throttle mobility, counter mobility and reduced eyes on the opposite. Therefore, even though the weather did non favor either side, it did not unploughed tactical goals of either side from existence established.The Battle After, the Battle of Bull counting both armies devoted the second half of 1861 and part of 1862 to make serious adfairments for more important battles to come. Procurement of supplies, training, recruiting new soldiers, and other military activities was the primary training mission of both armies. Neither force was in any particular hurry to organise an offensive operation. An impatient president confronted in the White House to see how his touristed commanding officer leave alone develop and utilize his big bus inessmanful forces.Gen McClellan strickle his forces in March 1862, via water, to the Virginia Peninsula between the York and James Rivers. The invention of this move was to take Richmond, Virginia. However, stoolston countered this plan by moving his Confederate soldiers overland in the same direction. Therefore, Gen Mc McClellan staged his troops at Fort Monroe. At the same time, Stonewall Jackson began his Shenandoah Valley Campaign, weakened in battle General Johnston was practise by Robert E. lee. On Oct. 6, the President instructed Gen McClellan to crossover the Potomac and slip by battle to the resistance, or lead him South.Your army must outright move, he said, while the roads are good. two dozen days exhausted in arrangement before Gen McClellan obeyed the order of the president. Gen McClellan complained of a lack of men and supplies to make it prudent to move forward. At length, October had nearly passed by and Gen leewards army thoroughly be and reorgani zed, and confabulations with Richmond re-established, the Army of the Potomac began to cross the river (Oct. 26), 100,000 strong. The Nationals led down the east side of the Blue ridge, still failed to strike the retreating Confederates over the mountain in flank or to get ahead of them and Gen downwind pushed Gen Longstreets troops over the Blue Ridge to Culpeper Courthouse, between the Army of the Potomac and Richmond, ready to engagement the advance of the Nationals. Quick and energetic movements were in a flash necessary to sever and defeat, in detail, Gen lee(prenominal)s army. (See lay out 1) On Nov. 75, the President eased Gen McClellan of command, and Gen Burnside took command of the Corps. A sense of responsibility made the latter(prenominal) commander exceedingly cautious.Before he travel, he endeavored to get his 120,000 men well in hand. Gen Burnside determined Aquia creek Landing as his resupply hub and main instauration for his assault. His overall decision w as to, and he moved the army towards Fredericksburg down the Fredericksburg Route towards Fredericksburg. The allowed his forces to cover Washington and assure better tribute of his lines of resupply and communication. Oon Nov. 150 Gen. Sumner led the movement from Warrenton down the left bank of the Rappahannock and covered closely 40 miles in two and one-half days to Falmouth.By November 21, Gen Longstreets Corps had arrived near Fredericksburg, and Gen Jacksons (which had been downriver along the Rappahannock to prevent hybridisations there) was succeeding(a) rapidly. Gen leeward at set-back pass judgment that he would fight Gen Burnside northwesterly of Fredericksburg and that it might be necessary to trim back behind the North Anna River. However, when he saw how slowly Gen Burnside was moving, he directed all of his army toward Fredericksburg. The first pontoon bridges arrived at Falmouth on November 25, oftentimes too late to enable the Army of the Potomac to cross t he river without opposition.Gen Burnside still had an opportunity, however, because he was facing only half of Gen lees army, not yet dug in, and if he acted quickly, he might be able to attack Longstreet and defeat him before Jackson arrived. erstwhile again, he squandered his opportunity. The bridges arrived at the end of the month, and by this time, Gen Jackson was show and Gen Longstreet was preparing strong defenses. Gen Burnside originally plannedplanned to use Gen McClellans original plan of to crossing his army east of Fredericksburg 10 miles (16 km) downstream at Skinkers Neck, but Earlys character arrived there and blocked him.Therefore,So he Gen Burnside intractable to cross directly at Fredericksburg. On December 9, he wrote to Halleck, I suppose now the enemy impart be more surprised by a crossing immediately in our front than any other part of the river. Im confident(p) that a large force of the enemy is now concentrated at embrasure Royal, its left resting on Fredericksburg, which we hope to turn. In addition to, his numerical advantage in troop strength, Gen Burnside also had the advantage of knowing his army could not be attacked effectively.On the other side of the Rappahannock, 220 artillery pieces had been located on the ridge cognize as Stafford heights to prevent Gen lee sides army from mounting any major counterstrikes. (See Map 1) On the morning of December 11, Union Engineers began the construction of six pontoon bridges in preparation for the passage of Union Forces crossways the Rappahannock River. Two located north of the township Center, a third on the gray end of town, and three further south near the confluence of the Rappahannock and Deep Run.During the lying of the pontoon bridges, Union Engineers came under punishing come alive from the Confederate Forces primarily from the sharpshooters of the Mississippi group commanded by Gen Barksdale. Gen Burnside. tThen ordered his Union artillery batteries then to sh elled the city. The artillery kindle lasted for an hour in terrific flood in hopes to drive the Confederate sharpshooters out of their positions. The bombardment failed to dampen the spirits of Barksdales sharpshooters, as soon as the artillery advance ceased the musketeers popped out of the holes and resumed firing.Thus, the first attempt to cross the river was a failure collectable to the Confederates fires on federal engineers constructing pontoon bridges on the river. Gen Burnsides cater immediately began mission analysis on another plan to cross the river. Gen Hunt suggested the only solution to cross the river are volunteers to cross by ferry run-in in pontoons to secure the opposite side of the river a lay suppressive fire on Confederate sharpshooters to cover the bridge layers.Because of a lack in presumption on his part, Gen BurnsideIf he was confident and active in issuing was slow in issuing his tactical instructions,instructions the Union Army of the Potomac may study caught the Confederates unready to defend their positions properly. In addition to the failure of the first attempt to cross, there wasAdditionally, a decrease in morale of the Union ForcesArmy of the Potomac and their senior commandeleadershipr due to the hesitation of Gen Burnsides decisionstheir overall commander on not just one scathing occasion but several occasions. new(prenominal) occasions of indecisiveness and lack of endeavor in dealing with the blunder of acquiring the pontoons transferred from Washington also attributed to the decrease in morale of not only the leadership leadership but also the Soldiers. Furthermore, the softness of Burnside to consider the advice advice, from Gen Halleck, was trying to give on where to cross the river showed the lack of communication from the field commander to Washington Headquarters. The oral sex Engineer of the Army ordered his engineers in the following format (Stackpole, p122) (These were the actual orders that were is sued) Engineers will place two pontoons bridges to be constructed at the site of old pontoon bridge, one of them to score approaches for artillery. One pontoon bridge at site of old canal-boat bridge approaches for artillery. Additionally, we will place two pontoon bridges just below mouth of Deep Run, a mile below Fredericksburg one to have artillery approach. Major Spaulding to throw three upper ones major Magruder to throw the next, and deputy sheriff Cross the lowest one. Bridge equipage, now at White Oak Church, to move up and go into park near Phillips house by dark.At midnight trains to move down within cd yards of river, and to move down and begin put down a two in the morning. If enemy fire is kept down, bridges to be thrown as soon as are unloaded if too hot, wait until artillery silences it The battle opened south of the city at 830 a. m. on December 13, when Maj. Gen. William Franklin ordered two of the sectionalisations from the Left Grand Division to subterfuge th emselves through an unseen gap in Gen Jacksons defenses on the right and head towards Hamiltons Crossing. By 10 a. m. , a thick fog began to lift, and the initially sluggish movements picked up speed.Gen Meades division of 4,500 men formed the main attack, in direct support of Gen Meadesthese movements the divisions of Gen Doubleday and Gen gibbon. The Virginia buck Artillery under Major John Pelham stalled the attack, and an artillery duel between Pelham and the Union artillery batteries lasted for approximately an hour. MAJ Pelham started his artillery attack with only two cannonsa 12-pounder pile smoothbore and a rifled Blakelybut continued with only one after counter-battery fire disabled one of the cannons.Gen Lee observed the activeness and commented about Pelham, age 24, It is glorious to see such endurance in one so young. As Meade finally made traction, he ran into Brig. Gen. Maxcy Greggs brigade, distribution it. Gen Gregg was shot and mortally wounded he died two day s later. To Gen Meades right, Gen Gibbons attack against the brigades of Brig. Gen. William Dorsey Pender and Edward L. Thomas made good progress, but Gen Meade and Gen Gibbon men became separated by 130 p. m. , a heavy Confederate counterattack pushed them back to the beachhead of the Rappahannock.Because of the blear conditions, Federal artillery could not provide much assistance because of the inability to recognise between Union and Confederate Forces. set back and chased by the Confederate metrical foot, raised some concerns with Gen Burnside, his divisions may be trapped at the river. The Federal line strengthened with addition of Brig. Gen. Daniel E. Sickles and Brig. Gen. David B. Birney divisions, and Stonewall Jacksons counterattack grounded to a halt. The focus of action moved north to Marye Heights. The initial assaults west of Fredericksburg began at 11 a. . as Frenchs divisiontwo divisions from Gen Couchs Corps, Gen Frenchs division and Gen autographs division, mov ed along the plunge Road, facing a steep-banked drainage floor and a wide, open plain of four hundred yards (370 m), dominated by Confederate infantry and artillery behind a drop road and stone wall. Earlier, artillerist Edward Porter Alexander, A chicken could not live on that field when we open on it, had secure Gen Longstreet. The Union men attacking had to excite d into columns over two tiny bridges across the drainage ditch, do them a massed target.Attempts to shift the attack farther to the right failed because of swampy ground. As in the south, Union artillery was prevented by fog from effectively silencing the Confederate guns as from Stafford Heights Union guns were unable to reach the Confederate positions. Gen Burnside had anticipated this attack on the right would be merely corroboratory of his main effort on the left, but Franklin had stalled and resisted entreaties to continue, so Gen Burnside shifted his emphasis. After Frenchs division was repulsed with heav y dismissales, Gen Burnside sent in the divisions of Gen Hancock and Gen Howard, which met a similar fate.By this time, Gen Picketts division and one of Gen Hoods brigades had marched north to honor Marye Heights. Gen Griffins division renewed the attack at 330 p. m. , followed by Gen Humphreys division at 4 p. m. At dusk, Gen Gettys division assaulted from the east and was repulsed. Gen Burnside sent six Union Divisions in, virtually one brigade at a time, for sixteen psyche charges, all of which failed, costing them from 6,000 to 8,000 casualties. Watching the abattoir from the center of his line, a position now known as Lees Hill, Gen Lee quoted as saying, It is well that war is so terrible, or we should grow too fond of it. The action on the heights also include the charge of the Irish Brigade, which lost 50% of its strength in the battle but advanced further up the heights than any other Union Brigade. Confederate losses at Marye Heights number around 1,200. The falling of darkness and the pleas of Gen Burnsides subordinates were passable to put an end to the attacks. Gen Longstreet later wrote, The charges had been grand and bloody, but utterly hopeless. Thousands of Union soldiers spent the cold December night on the fields leading to the Heights, unable to move or assist the wounded because of Confederate fire.The armies remained in position throughout the day on December 14, when Gen Burnside before long considered leading his old IX Corps in one final attack on Marye Heights, but with the suggestions of many of his officers, he reconsidered and abandoned his campaign sending his troops to northern bank of the Rappahannock River. That afternoon, Burnside asked Lee for a truce to attend to his wounded, which Lee graciously granted. The next day the Federal forces retreated across the river, and the campaign ended. implication 1.Short Term The Battle at Fredericksburg clearly showed how disastrous the Union Army Tactics were President Abraham Lincoln relieved Gen Burnside of command a month after this battle. 2. Long Term This was a major victory for the Army of Northern Virginia and costly to the Army of the Potomac. Many moot that Gen Lee lost his best chances to break the Gen Burnsides forces at Fredericksburg. Overall, the loss broke the morale of the Army of the Potomac and showed a weakness in the indecisiveness and lack of imagination in part of Gen Burnside. synopsisGen Burnside failed to achieve the tenant of world-class and his overall objective of destroying the enemy forces securing the town of Fredericksburg because he violated the pattern of protective covering and the Battle Operating System of Intelligence. The mountain of his forces fought to cross the river and very few were have-to doe with with providing suppressive fire for the unit crossing. Gen Lees forces upon making contact with what he believed to be the enemies fleeing main force at Devils Swamp, he committed himself to battle without pausing to use his cavalry to reconnoiter the country.Gen Lee used his CCavalry Troops conducted rereconnaissancecond to the east and west of the Rappahannock marshy lowlandsRiver, an action that gave him an extreme advantage into witnessing the movement of Gen Burnsides forceswhich might have permitted him to cross unmolested at a point up or downstream from the swamp. Thus, outflanking Culpepper and forcing him to withdraw without an opportunity to spring his cleverly crafted trap. The use of the terrain also gave Gen Lee a clear advantage as the Rappahannock River and lengthened entrenchments gave Gen Burnsides forces great difficulty.For his part, brigadier general CulpepperGen Lee effectively adhered to the Principles of Maneuver, Mass, and Economy of Force. done the Tenant of Synchronization, these factors combined to create the culminating Principle of Surprise. Outnumbered and outgunned, he realized that he could not achieve his objective of ascertaining Morgans Gen Burn sides force and denying it control of the aim and road junction, as well as Yearlingvilletown of Fredericksburg, by engaging in a conventional battle on anything go up even terms he used unconventional tactics to achieve his goal.He possessed a clear ground of what he had to accomplish and how he had to do so. He Gen Lee employed Maneuver and Mass of comminuted combat fountain at the decisive time and place while making effective use of both the weak and strong points of the units he led. By marring Morgan in the swampsstalling Burnsides movement across the river, he placed his enemy in a position of disadvantage. He shifted the battle to one where he positioned his massed combat power into a unconquerable enemy whose only option was to duck and die discontinue its efforts of seizing the town of Fredericksburg and retreat to the north side of the Rappahannock River.Culpepper Gen Lee exercised effective Synchronization and Economy of Force, dexterously controlling the movement s and fires of the disparate elements of his force in accordance with the elements of an intelligently conceived and workable plan of action in order to plant about the desired combat power at the decisive point. His employment of his cavalry, guerrillas, and militia reflected a thorough thought forge of utilizing each element in ana on the dot orchestrated maneuver exact instrumentality to achieve the desired effect of boot out the Army of the Potomac from the town of Fredericksburg back to the northern banks of the Rappahannock River. uring Morgans troops into the killing field of overwhelming force. His exploitation of Union Forces weaknesses in decisive movement and execution of a sound plan display Gen Lees his Seminole scouts superior knowledge of deprecative terrain features while denying the enemy the opportunity to effectively reconnoiter the same ground gave the critical element of Surprise once the battle was opened in accordance with the time, place and circumstan ces of his own choosing. Stackpole, Edward J.Drama on the Rappahannock The Fredericksburg Campaign. Mechanicsburg, papa Stackpole Books, 1991 P. 23 Stackpole, Edward J. Drama on the Rappahannock The Fredericksburg Campaign. Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania Stackpole Books, 1991 P. 121 Stackpole, Edward J. Drama on the Rappahannock The Fredericksburg Campaign. Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvania Stackpole Books, 1991, P. 122 OReilly, Francis Augustin, The Fredericksburg Campaign Winter War on the Rappahannock, lanthanum State University Press, 2003, P. 148 Goolrick, William K. and the Editors of Time-Life Books, Rebels revived Fredericksburg to Chancellorsville, Time-Life Books, 1985, P. 87 BIBLIOGRAPHY FM 3-0 Operations. Washington, D. C. Headquarters Department of the Army, 2001. Goolrick, William K. Rebels Resurgent Fredericksburg to Chancellorsville. Time-Life Books, 1985. Kennedy, Frances H. The Civil War Battlefield Guide. capital of Massachusetts Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990. Luvaas, Jay and Nelson, Harold W. The U. S. Army War College Guides to the Battles of Chancellorsville &038 Fredericksburg. Lawrence the University Press of Kansas, 1994.Mitchell, Joseph B. vital Battles of the Civil War. New York G. P. Putnams Sons, 1955. OReilly, Francis Augustin. The Fredericksburg Campaign Winter War on the Rappahannock. Louisiana State University Press, 2003. Palfrey, Francis W. The Army in the Civil War The Antietam &038 Fredericksburg. New York Charles Scribners Sons, 1885. Parish, Peter J. The American Civil War. New York Holmes &038 Meier Publishers, Inc, 1991. Stackpole, Edward J. Drama on the Rappahannock The Fredericksburg Campaign. Mechanicsburg, Pennsylvannia Stackpole Books, 1991.