Leadership in Practice: the Columbia Accident Essay

IntroductionFor this paper, I hand chosen to analyze the leading perfor homophilece of Linda ham actor, Chair of Mission Management police squad, and Daniel S. Goldin, NASA Administrator, 19922001. twain, in my estimation, were part of the problem, and not part of the solution. Both succumbed to immaterial political forces and placed much more emphasis on meeting self-imposed deadlines than astronaut caoutchouc. Both gradually dis confused the vast majority of the recommendations of the Rogers Commission after the breathing out of the Challenger and doomed NASA to fictionalise history.Background of leader 1Linda playact, Chair of the Mission Management group for the last capital of South Carolina mission, was employ by the National astronautics and Space Administration (NASA) soon after she graduated college. She began her line of achievement with NASA as a Propulsion Systems Monitor at the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas. Over the years she rose wine through the ranks of NASA to Chair the Mission Management squad for STS-107, which was the failed mission of the Space Shuttle Columbia that skint up upon re-entry into the earths atmosphere.Background of leader 2Daniel S. Goldin, NASA Administrator, 19922001, was hired by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) soon after he graduated college. He began his career at NASAs Lewis Research Center in Cleveland, Ohio working in electric propulsion systems for human beings interplanetary travel. He left NASA a few years later and began working for the TRW Space and Technology Group. Over his 25 year career at TRW, Goldin rose through the ranks to become the Vice President and General jitney of TRW. Goldin then returned to NASA and became its longest tenured Administrator. Goldin was known for being able to cut costs and still succeed many space programs.His crusade for efficiency (2004) ended up being the most visible speck in an administration philosophy that lost another seven astronauts. Another glimpse into what kind of man and leader Daniel S. Goldin is, can be found in a lawsuit by the Department of arbitrator that that seeks more than $170 million from TRW Inc., which is accused of padding government space contracts with research-and-development costs that should sop up been paid out of TRWs profits. The lawsuit contends that Daniel S. Goldin, who ran the companys Space & Technology Group during the early 1990s, participated in the alleged overcharges by authorizing suspect accounting practices. (1998)Leadership stylesBoth Goldin and Ham clearly pushed the NASA agenda which was locate by Goldin. Both appear to fit into the autocratic leadership style in that they demanded absolute obedience. incomplete fostered a culture where diverse assent was welcome. Both created an atmosphere where diverse or dissenting opinion was ignored and unwelcome. Goldin and Ham forced many NASA employees, specifically engineers and resort personnel, to become plaqueal bystanders (2008) because they were unwilling to happen their career to challenge the agenda of Goldin and Ham. NASA became a workplace with administrative blinders on. NASA is not functioning as a learning organization (Gehman, 2003). NASA mission managers were convinced, without study, that nothing could be done about such an emergency.The intellectual oddness and skepticism that a solid safety culture requires was almost entirely absent. Shuttle managers did not embracement safety-conscious attitudes. Instead, their attitudes were shaped and reinforced by an organization that, in this instance, was incapable of stepping back and gauging its biases. Bureaucracy and process trumped thoroughness and discernment (Gehman, 2003). Hams influence on STS-107 is most clearly described in this excerpt from the object lesson Study on the Columbia Accident by Maureen Hogan Casamayou, George Mason University, Fairfax, VirginiaHam did inquire about the bubble strike, bu t not to determine what action to take during Columbias mission, but to understand the implications for STS-114. During a Mission Management Team meeting on January 21, she asked about the rationale put forward at the STS-113 Flight Readiness review passed must(prenominal)er not because of their inherent validity (and hence greater safety for the crew) but simply to demonstrate another shuttle into space on schedule. As the CAIB report states, Hams focus on examining the rationale for continuing to fly after foam problems with STS-87 and STS-112 indicates that her attention had already shifted from the threat of the foam posed to STS-107 to the downstream implications of the foam strike. Ham was due to serve . . . as the launch integration manager for the next mission, STS-114. If the Shuttle Programs rationale to fly with foam loss was found to be flawed, the flight, due to be launched in about a month, would eat to be hold up per NASA rules that require serious problems to be resolved before the next flight.An STS-114 endure could in turn delay completion of the International Space Stations Node 2, which was a high priority remainder for NASA managers. Further evidence of her preoccupation with meeting the designated launch schedule was reflected in Hams business sector about the length of time to process photos of the Columbia on-orbit. According to the CAIB, on January 23rd Ham raised(a) misgivings that the extra time spent maneuvering Columbia to blade the left wing visible for imaging would unduly daze the mission schedule for example, science experiments would have to stop while imagery was taken. According to individualised notes obtained by the identity card Linda Ham said it was no longer being pursued since even if we apothegm something, we couldnt do anything about it. The Program didnt want to spend the resources. (CAIBR 2003)Further evidence of the uncontroversial assumptions and lack of intellectual curiosity at NASA is described by Niewoehner & Steidle, At the January 24, Mission Management Team meeting at which the no safety-of-flight conclusion was presented, there was little engineering discussion about the assumptions made, and how the results would resist if other assumptions were used. Engineering solutions presented to management should have included a quantifiable range of uncertainty and essay analysis. Those types of tools were readily available, routinely used, and would have serve welled management understand the risk involved in the finis. Management, in turn, should have demanded such information. The very absence of a clear and open discussion of uncertainties and assumptions in the analysis presented should have caused management to probe further. (2009) A different outcomeIn reviewing this case study, I am or so certain that leadership style played a secondary role in the situation. The primary spot appears to be that the leaders, Goldin and Ham to be specific, allowed the outside inf luence of cypherary constraints imposed by Congress and the presidential Administration to shape their mission and vision for NASA. In practical terms, the amount of money in the budget and the self-imposed goals of the number of shuttle missions to keep that budget from decreasing over-road concern for safety. Not only did it over-ride that concern for safety, but it created an organizational culture that ignored any line of thinking that challenged or threatened NASAs goals. We must remember that there are drawbacks in stating specific identified government organizational goals.When a government, or a component of government, forecasts where it wants to be in the future, it binds itself to those identified goals. Administrators become personally attached or emotionally involved and are loath to change for fear of appearing to admit misadventure. This certainly change the leadership and policy decisions of Goldin and Ham. Rocha could have done more to bring the safety concerns t o light, however in retrospect, he clearly would have risked his career in doing so. We need more leaders, and followers, who are willing to risk their career especially when human life is at stake. A different outcome for STS-107 is very likely if NASA had very functioned as a High Reliability Organization, which Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) say is characterized byA preoccupation with failureReluctance to simplify interpretationsSensitivity to operationsCommitment to resilienceDeference to expertiseGoldin and Ham could have implemented the five key dimensions of collaboration governance, administration, organizational autonomy, mutuality, and norms of trust and reciprocity. They could have created a team or committee to review, research, and assess each and every safety concern that was raised by any NASA employee. This team should have negotiated, committed, and then implemented those commitments. There was no trust and reciprocity between the NASA engineers and the NASA mission ma nagers. Goldin and Ham should have embraced a more Democratic Leadership Style. Although a Democratic leader will make the final decision, he/she invites other members of the team to contribute to the decision making process.This not only increases occupation satisfaction by involving employees or team members in whats going on, but it also help to develop peoples skills. Employees and team members feel in control of their own destiny, such as the promotion they deserve and so are motivated to work hard by more than fair(a) a financial reward. As participation takes time, this approach can lead to things happening more behind but often the end result is better. The approach can be most suitable where team work is essential and quality is more important than speed to market productivity. (2012)Yes, they would have likely missed future deadlines, probably scratched future missions, and maybe even lost some of NASAs precious funding from Congress, but the strengths of the five key dimensions were never given a chance to prevail. The reason why is glaringly clear The most costly resources of collaboration are not money but time and energy, uncomplete of which can be induced. Huxham (1996) With NASAs entire function hinging on budgetary concerns that became strict deadlines, time trumped safety and everyone from Congress and the Presidential administration to NASA management and the entire workforce, all have blood on their hands.My sceneAs a future leader, I am most profoundly struck by the impact of bureaucracy. I believe that even Goldin and Ham would have changed their decisions had they had the benefit of hindsight and knew that seven astronauts would lose their lives because of their lack of leadership, management, and administrative capabilities. We must listen to alternative viewpoints and encourage open dialogue as future government leaders. We must strive for objectivity in our perspective and not allow our vision to be narrowed by clinging too tigh tly to a concept or idea that was good in another setting. If human safety is in any way a factor, our level of scrutiny in gathering facts for decision making must be to the utmost. My biggest take-away from this assignment is learning the definition of a high dependableness organization and the five bullets that must be embraced to be a true high reliability organization. I will take this concept with me for the rest of my career.Roberts, A. (2004). The reform bubble bursts. Public Administration Review,64(5), 625-629. Retrieved from http//search.proquest.com/docview/197172592?accountid=27965 By, A. P. (1998, Feb 20). courteous fraud lawsuit against TRW inc. over space contracts is joined by U.S. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from http//search.proquest.com/docview/398647798?accountid=27965 Marc, S. G., & Robert, B. S. (2008). Organizational bystanders. mass and Strategy, 31(1), 47-54. Retrieved from http//search.proquest.com/docview/224596278?accountid=27965 Gehman, H.W. et. a l., Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Report Volume 1 (CAIB) (August 2003).Columbia Accident Investigation Board Report (Washington D.C. Government Printing Office, Limited First Printing, August 2003)Robert, J. N., & Craig, E. S. (2009). The loss of the space shuttle Columbia Portaging leadership lessons with a critical thinking model. Engineering Management Journal, 21(1), 9-18. Retrieved from http//search.proquest.com/docview/208970180?accountid=27965 Weick, K., & Sutcliffe, K. (2001). Managing the Unexpected. San Francisco Jossey-Bass Bhatti, N., Ghulam, M. M., Shaikh, N., Muhammad, A. H., & Faiz, M. S. (2012). The impact of autocratic and democratic leadership style on job satisfaction. International Business Research, 5(2), 192-201. Retrieved from http//search.proquest.com/docview/963357720?accountid=27965 Huxham, Chris. 1996. Collaboration and Collaborative Advantage. In Creating Collaborative Advantage, edited by Chris Huxham, 118. Thousand Oaks, CA Sage Publications. ( Stillman cccxxiii)Stillman, Richard. Public Administration, 9th Edition. Cengage Learning US, Aug-04. .